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Abstract 
 
The Chinese state undertakes large scale investments in a number of countries under the 
auspices of economic cooperation related investment (ECI). While there are suggestions that 
it is an extension of China‟s soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in those countries, 
often for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in the literature. In 
this paper, we examine this investment of the Chinese state over time. Our results suggest 
that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors that are used in the stylised 
literature  to  explain  directional  patterns  of  outward  FDI.  They  also  demonstrate  that  the 
(positive)  relationship  between  Chinese  ECI  and  the  recipient  countries‟  natural  resource 
richness is not economically meaningful. Finally, while there is some support for the popular 
wisdom that China‟s willingness to do business with a country is not strongly affected by its 
level  of corruption,  there is  much weaker support,  if  any, for the hypotheses  that China 
favours doing business with countries where political rights are limited. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Until recently, the behaviour and strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) was viewed 
largely  through  the  prism  of  the  ownership-location-internalisation  (OLI)  paradigm 
(Dunning, 1988). An MNE was believed to be an entity that has ownership of some special 
capability (e.g., technology) that it can leverage by gaining access to a resource available in 
another country or to an overseas market. However, rather than import the resource or export 
to the overseas market, the MNE might choose to internalise the process of accessing this 
resource or market by setting up an operation in that overseas location, because the expected 
profits  from  such  internalisation  is  higher.  There  is  an  extensive  literature  on  both  the 
determinants of the choice between actual market entry and alternatives like franchising, as 
well as  the determinants  of alternative  entry modes  like  greenfield projects,  cross-border 
acquisitions and joint ventures (JV) (see Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009, and the 
references therein).
1 
  The recent surge of FDI from emerging markets,
2 and the consequent rise in interest 
about the emerging market MNEs (EMNEs), suggests that these entities do not conform to 
the traditional view of MNEs. Indeed, in most cases, these firms do not possess capabilities 
similar to developed country MNEs and that, indeed, overseas expansion is often a means to 
acquire such capabilities. The high profile acquisitions of IBM‟s personal computer business 
by Lenovo of China and the Jaguar-Land Rover brands by Tata Motors of India are examples 
of this pursuit of capabilities. At the same time, these emerging market firms have certain 
                                                 
1 There is an allied literature on formation of JVs – often the initial mode of entry on account of 
paucity of information about the local market or on account of regulations that forbid foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in any other form – and their subsequent dissolution (as the extent of informational 
asymmetry is reduced) (see Sinha, 2001).  
 
2 According to data from UNCTAD, outward FDI from developing countries comprised less than two 
percent of worldwide FDI outflows in the 1970s. By 2005 -2007, the share of developing countries 
increased to an average rate of 14%; China accounts for 10% of developing country FDI outflow (see 
UNCTAD‟s FDI on-line database).   
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characteristics that manifest their successful survival in contexts with missing institutions and 
markets, but those that might be detrimental for successful overseas expansion. For example, 
it  is  now  well  understood  that  family  ownership  and  formation  of  business  groups  in 
emerging markets are an optimal response to an environment of weak contract enforcement 
and missing (or imperfect) capital markets,  respectively (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2009). 
But,  as  recent  research  suggests,  family  control  or  business  group  affiliation  discourages 
overseas investment on account of factors such as weak corporate governance in such firms 
and reluctance to bear the cost of altering the style of management in an alien environment 
about which the emerging market firm has little information (see Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 
2010, and the references therein).  
  Mathews  (2006)  proposes  the  linkages-leveraging-learning  (LLL)  paradigm  to 
explain  the  second  wave  of  internationalisation  involving  the  EMNEs.  He  argues  that  a 
critical element of an EMNE‟s process of early internationalisation is that it focuses not on its 
innate ownership advantages, but on advantages that can be acquired through linkages with 
the external environment. The first-wave MNEs thought of partnerships and joint ventures as 
second-best options that can lead to erosion of ownership advantages through leakage of 
information but that are necessary to overcome short-term informational disadvantages that 
hinder the process of internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The second-wave 
EMNEs, by contrast, think of them as being integral to their risk management and technology 
partnering strategies (Wells, 1998). The second element of the LLL paradigm is that, rather 
than focus on ways in which access to resources can be monopolised, EMNEs concentrate on 
how resources can be better leveraged through alliances. The final element of the paradigm is 
learning, the process whereby EMNEs refine their strategies that facilitate both linkages and 
leveraging  of  resources.  As  such,  successful  internationalization  by  EMNEs  might  be 4 
 
contingent on their ability to build and leverage alliances, and it is easy to see that states (or 
governments) might be a crucial component of such alliances. 
  The  literature  has  examined  the  role  of  firm-level  alliances  in  facilitating 
internationalisation and the role of foreign investors in providing linkages that are crucial for 
internationalisation, mostly in the context of Asian EMNEs (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Mathews, 
2006; Zhan, 1995). Surprisingly, however, it has overlooked the advantages that EMNEs 
generally tend to derive from alliances with their own governments. Yet, there are a large 
number  of  examples  that  highlight  the  role  of  states  in  promoting  business  interests  of 
national  firms.  The  advantages  enjoyed  by  Chinese  and  Indian  petroleum  firms  in  the 
Sakhalin oil and gas fields in Russia, as also in countries like Venezuela and Sudan, and the 
support provided by the Indian government for Mittal Steel (technically, a Dutch company!) 
when the latter experienced difficulties with its bid for Arcelor provide examples of the role 
that states can and do play in the internationalisation and expansion processes of EMNEs. 
Indeed,  while  the  ability  of  states  to  promote  domestic  firms  using  subsidies  or  tax 
advantages has been reduced in the post-WTO era, it is well understood that at least some of 
them still retain the ability to influence decisions in favour of their domestic firms using soft 
power. While state support can be important for EMNEs (or firms in general) in any industry, 
it is likely to prove crucial when these firms seek access to resources that are viewed as those 
of national importance (and thereby usually government controlled) by other countries.
3 
  In this paper, we  address this lacuna in the literature, by attempting to reconcile a 
state‟s – in this case China‟s – projection of soft power with factors that usually determine the 
extent and direction of outward FDI from emerging markets. The choice of China as focus of 
                                                 
3 A good example of the role of the state in facilitating or hindering private transactions in such cases 
is that of the failed 2005 bid by the China National Offshore Oil Company Limited (CNOOC) to 
acquire Unocal, the US oil company. The access available to Chinese and Indian oil companies to 
Russia‟s Sakhalin oil and gas fields provides a stark contrast to CNOOC‟s Unocal experience. 
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our analysis is interesting on two counts. First, there is a conjecture that the Chinese state 
facilitates outward FDI of Chinese MNEs, by providing crucial linkages with destination 
countries (Buckley et al., 2008). Further, a noticeable proportion of the overseas ventures of 
Chinese firms has been in resource-rich developing countries where resources are de jure or 
de facto under government control and not easily accessible through market transactions.
4 
Our proxy for the projection of soft power is economic cooperation related investment by the 
Chinese state in other countries. We find that the amount and direction of this investment can 
be well explained by factors that are used in the stylised literature to explain overseas FDI of 
firms. We, therefore, conclude that there is  prima facie evidence that the Chinese state uses 
economic cooperation as a tool to facilitate overseas FDI of the Chinese MNEs (CMNEs).  
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the role of the 
Chinese state in facilitating outward FDI. The regression specification is outlined in Section 
3. In Section 4, we discuss the data and the empirical strategy. The regression results and 
their implications are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Outward Investment and the Chinese State 
It  is  generally  agreed  that  CMNEs  enjoy  certain  firm-specific  advantages  that  they  can 
leverage as they expand their operations overseas. They are able to access capital at a cost 
that is lower than their global rivals. In part, this is on account of access to cheap credit 
offered by the Chinese state-owned banks or, in the case of state-owned firms, by the state 
itself (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006; Lardy, 1998; Warner, Hong and Xu, 2004). Access to 
inexpensive capital can also be the outcome of internal capital markets operated by Chinese 
conglomerates (Tsai, 2002). CMNEs are also able to leverage their relationships with the 
                                                 
4 According to China‟s Ministry of Commerce, by the end of 2004, there were over 7,500 Chinese 
“non-trade  enterprises”  in  the  rest  of  the  world  (Hong  and  Sun,  2006).  Most  of  this  was  in  the 
manufacturing and natural resource sectors.  
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Chinese diaspora in the countries in which they invest, reducing the risk associated with such 
investment (Lecraw, 1977; Zhan, 1995). 
  During  the  early  years  of  the  reform  process,  Chinese  overseas  investments  were 
dominated by large state-owned companies, and key investment decisions, including location 
of overseas operations, were dictated by political considerations (Hong and Sun, 2006). For 
example,  the  decision  to  invest  in  Hong  Kong‟s  infrastructure  was  aimed  at  enhancing 
Chinese influence in what was, at that time, British territory on which China had a claim. By 
1992, the ideological debate about the direction of China‟s reform had been resolved, and 
encouragement of overseas investment by Chinese firms became an established part of the 
state‟s long term strategy. Overseas investment emerged as a tool to gain access to both 
technology and natural resources. High profile examples of such investments include those 
made in Indonesian and Algerian oil fields, South African mines, the Brazilian steel industry 
and the US technology sector. Outward FDI was also aimed at providing Chinese companies 
access  to  overseas  markets  and  international  brands.  Haier,  for  example,  invested  in 
production facilities in the United States to bypass quotas and anti-dumping measures, while 
TCL gained access to the Thomson and Alcatel brands. The 1992-98 period witnessed a 
cautious  implementation  of  this  strategy  to  go  global,  but  the  strategy  has  been  pursued 
vigorously  since  1999.  There  is  a  growing  literature  on  the  strategic  aspects  of  the 
transnationalization process of CMNEs (Sauvant, 2005; Zhang, 2005). 
  The determinants of the direction of Chinese outward FDI itself have been examined. 
Buckley et al. (2007) have demonstrated that, in keeping with expectations, outward FDI 
from China is positively associated with the size of the host market, its cultural proximity to 
China, and its openness to FDI. Their results are also consistent with the popular perception 
about  the  natural  resource-seeking  nature  of  Chinese  outward  FDI  (see  Deng,  2003). 
However, contrary to expectations, FDI is also positively correlated with a country‟s political 7 
 
risk. They explain this anomaly by alluding to the low cost of capital for CMNEs, especially 
those in the public sector, and the apparent lack of sophistication of risk evaluation processes 
of these companies.  
However, while the determinants of Chinese outward FDI have been examined (see 
Buckley et al., 2007, and the references therein), despite the dominant role of the Chinese 
state in setting the agenda for strategic overseas investment, an examination of the largely 
state driven activities that might be correlated with outward FDI and, in some cases, form the 
basis  for  investment-for-resources  (for  CMNEs)  swap  in  resource-rich  countries,  has 
remained  largely  unexamined.  This  is  despite  the  state‟s  dominant  role  in  the  Chinese 
economic landscape (Child and Tse, 2001), and despite the proximity of a large majority of 
the CMNEs to the Chinese state (Cheng and Ma, 2007). Indeed, the only known research that 
has linked the Chinese state‟s bilateral relations with other countries with outward FDI from 
China has  examined the impact  of the country‟s  double taxation treaty  – much more an 
economic incentive for firms than a proxy for the Chinese state‟s strategic engagement with 
the potential destination countries – on such FDI (Buckley et al., 2008).  
  As mentioned earlier, in this paper, we examine an activity of the Chinese state that 
arguably  captures  that  strategic  dimension,  namely,  its  overseas  investments  related  to 
economic  cooperation.  In  2006,  turnover  from  such  economic  cooperation  activities  was 
close to US$ 35.7 billion, twice the magnitude of China‟s net outward FDI of US$ 17.6 
billion.
5  A large proportion of this investment is aimed at building infrastructure in the 
recipient countries, especially in developing countries. In late 2004, for example, Chinese 
contractors built office buildings in Luanda and repaired Angola‟s railway system that was 
mostly destroyed during the country‟s 27-year long civil war (Walt, 2006). In Iran, such 
                                                 
5  The  stock  of  Chinese  overseas  FDI  reached  $170  billion  at  the  end  of  2008  (see  Rosen  and 
Hanemann, 2009).  
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investment has been used to develop transport-related infrastructure and dams (Walt, 2005).
6 
In both countries, soon after the initiation of “economic cooperation”, Chinese oil and gas 
companies, who are at the forefront of Chinese outward FDI, received licences to operate 
large  oil  fields.  While  any  causality  between  the  economic  cooperation  and  the 
aforementioned licence cannot be established without further evidence, it is easy to see that 
there  is  evidence  of  at  least  correlation  between  China‟s  economic  cooperation  related 
investment on both subsequent outward FDI of Chinese companies and on their access to 
resources that are of national importance to other countries. In the rest of the paper, we 
examine this link more closely. 
 
3. Model Specification 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, we examine whether factors that are used in the stylised 
literature to explain amount and direction of outward FDI can also explain satisfactorily the 
amount and direction of the economic cooperation related investment of the Chinese state. If 
they do, we would be able to conclude that there is at least prima facie evidence that this 
investment, which is arguably a proxy for the Chinese state‟s strategic projection of soft 
power, facilitates the outward FDI of CMNEs.  
The  basis  for  our  empirical  exercise  is  the  gravity  model  that  is  widely  used  in 
empirical investigations of the determinants of bilateral international exchange (trade or FDI 
flows).
7 In its most basic form, the gravity equation includes trading partners‟ gross domestic 
                                                 
6  It  must  be  evident  by  now  that  while  the  Chinese  state  is  the  sponsor  or  promoter  for  these 
investments, the actual work is undertaken by Chinese firms with close links to the state. Indeed many 
if not most of the contractors are Chinese state-owned firms. 
 
7 Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966), both of whom study trade flows across countries, are 
among the earliest contributors to this literature. The gravity model posits that trade and investment 
flows between any two countries is a positive function of the  economic size of the countries and an 
inverse function of the physical distance between them.  
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products, per capita gross domestic products, and physical distance from each other.
8 The 
model has reliably  explained trade and investment flows across countries, and hence its  
popularity. The basic gravity equation can be extended to include other “distance” variables 
that either enhance or impede bilateral investment flows. Accordingly, we use as the basis of 
our  analysis  a  gravity  model  that  is  extended  to  take  into  account  other  factors  such  as 
cultural similarity and resource richness of the destination countries for the Chinese economic 
cooperation. Additionally, we take into consideration the impact of institutional quality in 
potential host countries for Chinese outward FDI, an important factor influencing FDI flows 
(Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova, 1998). Our regression model, therefore, is as follows: 
  ECIi = ʱ + Γ΄X + ʦ΄Z + e                (1) 
where X is a vector that includes variables that capture the stylised gravity model, Z is a 
vector of other variables that might affect FDI flows, and e is the i.i.d. error term.  
The  literature  on  gravity  models  suggests  that  the  following  variables  should  be 
included in X:  
(a) The GDP of the ECI (and hence potentially FDI) recipient country (GDP) which 
captures the market size. In general, larger countries are expected to receive a larger volume 
of FDI. This would especially be true if outward FDI is market seeking, which is apparently 
the case with at least a part of Chinese outward FDI (Taylor, 2002; Zhang, 2003).  
(b) The per capita GDP of the ECI recipient country (GDPPC) captures its state of 
development. Its impact on the volume of FDI is theoretically indeterminate. On the one 
hand, outward FDI to developed countries facilitates access to technology or products that 
developing country firms are unable to develop on their own. On the other hand, there is also 
                                                 
8 For contributions using trade data, see e.g., Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2008), Levinson 
and Taylor (2008), Co (2004), and Rauch (1999). For contributions using investment data, see e.g., 
Bevan and Estrin (2004), McCalman (2004), Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), Smith (2001), and 
Ferrantino (1993). 
 10 
 
evidence to suggest that developing country firms tend to invest more in countries at similar 
stages of development, where they can leverage their experience and competitive advantages 
acquired in their home countries (Cross et al., 2007), and where they are better able to meet 
the price-quality expectations of the consumers (Lecraw, 1977) than their developed country 
rivals. 
(c) The evidence about the nature of the relationship between bilateral trade between 
China and potential recipient of ECI (BITRADE) that captures the extent to which the two 
economies are integrated, and perhaps also whether at least one of the two countries has 
resources that are of strategic importance to the other.
9 The empirical evidence about the 
impact of bilateral trade on FDI flows is mixe d. Egger (2001), for example, argues that, for 
European countries, exports and outward FDI are substitutes, while Bevan and Estrin (2004) 
and Liu, Wang and Wei (2001) find that exports  (imports) and outward (inward) FDI are 
complementary.  
(d)  The geographical distance between the source and recipient countries of  ECI 
(GEODIST) that captures the transportation cost of doing business. It is easy to see that the 
relationship  between  FDI  and  geographical  distance  is  type  dependent.  The  extent  of 
horizontal  FDI  increases  with  geographical  distance  because  distance  increases  the 
transactions cost of trade (Brainard, 1993; Horstman and Markusen, 1987; Markusen and 
Venables, 1998).  By  contrast,  vertical  FDI  and distance have an inverse relationship, on 
account of the adverse impact of transport cost on input cost (Helpman, 1984). The empirical 
evidence suggests that, on balance, the relationship between FDI and geographical distance 
between source and recipient countries is indeed inverse (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Shatz and 
Venables, 2001).  
                                                 
9 It is easy to see that in the latter case, from a OLI theory point of view, there are potential gains from 
outward FDI from one to the other to internalise this strategic advantage (Markusen, 1995). 
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  In the Z vector, to begin with, we include the cultural distance between China and the 
potential ECI recipient country that captures the non-transportation transactions cost of doing 
business (CULDIST). Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) have argued that cost of entry increases 
with distance while operational benefits and ability to transfer core competencies to overseas 
operations are inversely related to it. Similarly, Rauch (1999) suggests that the cost of doing 
business with countries that are culturally close is lower. 
  Next,  we  include  a  measure  of  institutional  quality  (INSTQLTY),  or  business 
environment, that impact performance and hence strategic decisions of firms. It is stylised the 
weak institutions in the form of weak property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Lee and 
Mansfield, 1996), and corruption (Wei, 2000) can have adverse impact on FDI flows, largely 
by increasing uncertainty and increasing contracting cost. 
  Finally, we include two variables that  capture the popular  wisdom  about  Chinese 
strategic economic interests in other countries. First, we include a measure for the natural 
resource endowment of the recipient country (NR). As we have already noted, part of the 
Chinese “go global” strategy is to gain access to scarce natural resources. There is evidence 
to suggest that a significant proportion of outward FDI by Chinese companies, led by state-
owned  firms,  is  in  natural  resources  (Cai,  1999;  Zhan,  1995).  There  is  also  evidence  to 
suggest that this activity has been actively supported by the Chinese state (Jubany and Poon, 
2006).  Second,  we  also  include  a  measure  of  political  rights  in  the  recipient  country 
(POLRIGHT).  This  not  only  accounts  for  the  popular  perception  that  China‟s  strategic 
interests include developing business relationships with resource rich developing countries 
with  autocratic  regimes,  it  is  also  consistent  with  the  more  general  empirical  evidence 
(Mathur and Singh, 2007; Schulz, 2007).
10   
                                                 
10 This may not be as counter-intuitive as it may seem at first glance. Note that the cost of negotiating 
a contract is likely to be lower in an environment where there is a unique centre of political power 
than in an environment where multiple agents with diverse interests wield veto powers. 12 
 
  Our regression specification, therefore, is as follows: 
ECIi = α + γ1 GDPi + γ2 GDPPCi + γ3 BITRADEi + γ4 GEODISTi + 1 CULDISTi  
+ 2 INSTQLTYi + 3 NRi + 4 POLRIGHTi + ei        (2) 
where i is the index for the ECI recipient countries. We also experiment with interactions 
between NR and the measures of institutional quality and political rights. The purpose of this 
experiment is to examine whether the Chinese state interact differently with resource rich 
countries that have different levels of institutional quality and political rights – Australia, 
Russia and Nigeria, for example – or, conversely, whether the way in which the Chinese state 
interact with a country with a given level of institutional quality or political right depends on 
whether or not that country is resource rich (see Schulz, 2007). 
If indeed ECI manifests the Chinese state‟s strategic interests and projection of soft 
power in a way that subsequently facilitates outward FDI of CMNEs, we should observe two 
things. First, this specification, which is used in the stylised literature to explain quantity and 
direction of FDI flows, should also explain the quantity and direction of ECI reasonably well. 
Second,  the  qualitative  impact  of  these  explanatory  variables  on  Chinese  economic 
cooperation related investment should be consistent with those observed in the stylised FDI 
literature. We shall revisit these issues later in the paper. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
The data on China‟s economic cooperation related investment – the dependent variable in our 
regression model – are obtained from various editions of China Statistical Yearbook.
11 These 
are annual flows of such investment measured in (millions of) US dollars.   Information 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 For detailed descriptions of these data, see p. 758 of  China National Bureau of Statistics, 2007, 
China Statistical Yearbook 2007, Beijing: China Statistics Press. Or Statistical System of Foreign 
Contracted Project, Labor Service Cooperation and Design Consultation Operation issued by the 
Ministry of Commerce, December 30, 2004. 
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provided in the Yearbooks suggests that much of the investment was used to finance projects 
such as construction of dams, roads and railways.  
  The data for the explanatory variables in equation (2) are collected from a number of 
sources. Data on GDP and per capita GDP, measured in constant 2000 international dollars, 
are obtained from the 2005 version of the World Development Indicators that are released 
annually by the World Bank. Data on bilateral trade between China and each of the recipient 
countries are obtained from the aforementioned Yearbooks.  
Measures  of  geographical  and  cultural  distance  are  from  the  Centre  d‟Etudes 
Prospectives et d‟Informations Internationales (CEPII). The measure of geographical distance 
(in kilometers) is based on the great circle formula using the latitudes and longitudes of the 
most  important  cities  in  the  countries.
12  Following Rauch (1999), our proxy for c ultural 
distance is commonality of language; it is a dichotomous variable equal to one if a language 
is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both China and the ECI recipient country. 
Information  about  the  natural  resource  endowments  of  the  recipient  countries  for 
Chinese  investment,  measured  as  the  shares  of  energy  and  non-energy  minerals  in  their 
exports,  were  also  obtained  from  the  World  Development  Indicators.  These  are  the  best 
available proxies for the relative importance of resources in a country‟s economy. Ideally, we 
would have preferred to use energy and non-energy shares in the GDP, but these data are not 
readily available.
13  
  Finally, in keeping with the  literature (see Meyer et al., 2009), we use as proxies of 
institutional quality indices  generated by the Heritage Foundation. Since indices measuring 
                                                 
12 This measures as-the-crow-flies distance, see Mayer and Zignano (2006) for details.  It is common 
practice to use as-the-crow-fly distance between each partner‟s capitals; since CEPII‟s distance data 
capture other important cities, it is a superior measure.   
 
13 We have, nevertheless, estimated regression models that use as the measure of resource richness the 
combined share of fuels and minerals in total exports, but since the results are very similar to those 
reported in the next section, we do not report them in this paper. 
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various aspects of institutional quality are highly correlated, we choose the corruption index 
as our measure of this quality. This is consistent with the large literature on the impact of 
corruption on FDI. The index has a range of zero through 100, and a high measure on this 
100-point  scale  indicates  low  incidence  of  corruption.  Finally,  also  in  keeping  with  the 
stylised literature, we use as our measure of the quality of political rights in the recipient 
countries the index reported by Freedom  House. It is  a 7-point index, with a score of 1 
indicating the highest level of political freedom.  
  Since  data  for  developing  countries  –  destination  for  a  significant  proportion  of 
Chinese economic cooperation related investment – are not always available for all the years, 
we  have  sometimes  had  to  substitute  missing  values  with  available  values  of  the 
corresponding variables going back one or two years. For example, if data for energy exports 
for 2000 are not available for a country, we have substituted it with the energy export data for 
1999 or, if data for 1999 are unavailable as well, with data for 1998. When working with 
developing country data, such imputation of value of missing values is not uncommon in the 
literature (see Meyer et al. 2009), and helps minimise loss of observations on account of 
missing data. Imputation is mostly done for fuel and mineral exports, and no more than 6% of 
these data are imputed in the 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 periods. However, availability of 
these data in 2003 is comparatively low so the extent of imputation for 2004-2006 is higher at 
17% for fuels and 14% for minerals. Importantly, a comparison of the 2003 data with the 
2001 and 2002 data show that the latter are within 3 percentage points of the 2003 value for 
about 90% of all countries with comparable data for these years. Hence, we conclude that the 
exercise involving imputation could not have affected our estimation significantly. 
As evident from the above discussion, we have data for nine years: 1998-2006, for up 
to 118 destinations of Chinese economic cooperation related investment. We aggregate the 
data into three periods – 1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 – and use period aggregates 15 
 
for  the  investment  variable  as  the  dependent  variable  in  our  regression  analysis.  This 
technique, variations of which are widely used in the economics literature (see Barro, 1991; 
Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay and Krishnan, 2010), ensures that our results are not affected by 
year-specific idiosyncratic spikes in the investment data. Also, to eliminate the problem of 
endogeneity, we use lagged values of the explanatory variables. For example, we explain the 
variation  in  the  1998-2000  aggregates  of  economic  cooperation  related  investment  using 
1997 values of the independent variables.  
  The distributions of the natural log of ECI (LECI) for the three periods appear in 
Figure 1. A right-ward shift in the distribution is quite evident, indicative of an increase in 
Chinese economic cooperation investment across countries over time. Before reporting the 
full  descriptive  statistics  for  and  the  correlation  among  ECI  and  its  regressors,  we  also 
highlight the relationship between ECI and some recipient country characteristics that have 
been  the  source  of  many  discussions  in  popular  discourses  about  Chinese  overseas 
investment. In Figure 2, we report the relationship between ECI and the natural resource 
richness of the recipient countries, as captured by the shares of energy (FUEL) and non-
energy minerals (MINERAL) in their exports. In Figure 3, we report the relationship between 
ECI and the institutional quality (CORRFREE) of and the political freedom (POLRIGHT) in 
the recipient countries. Figure 2 suggests that if one considers only countries that are rich in 
natural resources, with energy or non-energy minerals accounting for more than 30% of their 
exports, a mild  positive relationship  may be observed between  ECI and natural  resource 
richness of the recipient countries. However, there is a large variation in ECI in countries for 
whom the natural resource intensiveness of exports is less than 20%. Overall, if one ignores 
the outliers in the top right and bottom left quadrants of the scatter diagrams, there is little 
sign of any pattern between ECI and these recipient country characteristics. Similarly, Figure 16 
 
3 is not indicative of any definitive patterns between ECI and corruption and political rights 
in these recipient countries.  
INSERT Figures 1-3 about here 
The  descriptive  statistics  for  ECI  and  our  regressors  are  reported  in  Table  1, 
separately  for  the  three  aforementioned  time  periods.
14  Some  interesting  things  are 
immediately obvious from these statistics. First, while the average recipient country of 
China‟s ECI is quite developed, with a per capita income of $9,000-10,000 in all the three 
periods, there is a huge variation in their state of development. Hence, if indeed ECI is a 
strategic tool for projection of China‟s soft power and strategic interests, it is targeted at a 
wide  range  of  countries,  developed  and  developing.  Second,  the  average  ECI  recipient 
country is quite far from China, with their capital cities separated by about 9,000 kilometres, 
on average. This is consistent with the popular perception about China‟s increasing strategic 
interests in other continents like Africa and Latin America. Third, to the extent that ECI is 
aimed at ensuring Chinese companies‟ control of natural resources, fuel (i.e., oil and gas) is 
much more important than other natural resources. The share of fuel in the exports of the 
average ECI recipient country is about 15% or higher. However, this share declined from a 
peak of 19.5% for the 2001-03 period to 14.6% for the 2004-06 period, indicating that China 
may not be as focussed on oil and gas as it used to be earlier this decade. Finally, while the 
Chinese state is  not  averse to  doing  business  with corrupt countries,  contrary to  popular 
perceptions,  it  does  not  have  a  cosy  relationship  with  dictatorial  and  tyrannical  regimes. 
While the average recipient country scores 43 on the 100-point corruption scale (100 being 
least corrupt), it scores 3-3.3 on the 7-point political rights scale (1 being the best). Indeed, 
                                                 
14 The values of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the specification are less than 5, indicating 
that the multicollinearity problem in the specification of equation (2) is not significant. 
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while the corruption score of the average country has remained steady at around 43 over time, 
the political rights score has improved from 3.31 in 1998-2000 to 3.0 in 2004-06. 
INSERT Table 1 about here 
 
5. Discussion of Regression Results 
The regression estimates for equation (2), augmented by the interaction terms, are reported in 
Table 2, as are the robust standard errors within parentheses. We report the estimates of six 
models or specifications. Models (1) – (3) use as the measure for resource richness the share 
of  the  fuel  (energy)  exports  in  total  exports  of  the  countries  that  are  the  destinations  of 
China‟s economic cooperation related investment, while models (4) – (6) use the share of 
ores and minerals (non-energy mining) exports in total exports of these countries. Note that 
our regression coefficients for the interaction terms are largely insignificant; and, even when 
they are statistically significant, they are very small and not economically meaningful. Hence, 
in the rest of this section, we shall not discuss them any further. 
INSERT Table 2 about here 
The F-statistics for all six models are significant at the 1% level, and the adjusted R-
square values range between 0.40 and 0.47, indicating that the regression models fit the data 
reasonably well.
15 To recapitulate, one aim of our exercise was to see whether a specification 
that is used in the literature to explain the magnitude and direction of FDI flows also explains 
well the magnitude and direction of Chinese ECI. If it did – which seems to be the case – we 
could infer that an important use of the ECI, a tool to promote Chinese strategic interests 
overseas, is to facilitate outward FDI by Chinese companies. In light of the goodness of fit of 
our model to the inter-country variation in ECI flows, it would be reasonable to make that 
                                                 
15 For the sake of comparison, the models estimated by Buckley et al. (2007), which use a similar 
framework to explain the direction of Chinese outward FDI, provide adjusted R-square values of 
0.36-0.67.   
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inference. Further, we should note that the specification worked better for the 1998-2000 and 
2001-03 periods than for the 2004-06 period, at least when fuel is used as the proxy for 
natural resources, perhaps indicating that the Chinese state‟s ECI was a much more important 
tool for facilitating outward FDI during the early years of internationalisation by Chinese 
companies.  This  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  existing  literature  which  suggests  that 
EMNEs require more help during their early stage of internationalisation. 
Next,  we should discuss  whether the stylised specification  explains  inter-recipient 
country  variation  in  ECI  in  a  way  that  is  qualitatively  consistent  with  the  stylised  FDI 
literature. For example, if a country with a higher aggregate GDP receives a larger quantity of 
ECI, it would be consistent with the stylised result that larger economies receive more FDI. 
The consistency of our results with the stylised FDI literature would provide further evidence, 
albeit indirect, that Chinese ECI is a strategic tool to facilitate the outward FDI of CMNEs. 
Before embarking on that discussion, let us first summarise our results:  
(i)  The  (log  of)  GDP  of  a  country  had  the  expected  positive  impact  on  China‟s 
economic cooperation related investment in that country only in the 2001-2003 period, and 
this coefficient is significant only at the 5% level.  
(ii) Chinese economic cooperation related investment increases sharply with a decline 
in the level of development of a country, the state of development being inversely related to 
the GDP per capita. This is hardly surprising; developing countries would be the natural 
destination of these investments which primarily involve construction projects. 
(iii) Ceteris paribus, Chinese ECI is higher for countries that are culturally closer to 
China.  
(iv)  There  is  some  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  China‟s  economic  cooperation 
related investment would be higher for resource rich countries. But the correlation between 
the  extent  of  a  country‟s  resource  richness  and  Chinese  investment  is  not  economically 19 
 
significant  (i.e.,  the  regression  coefficients  have  small  magnitudes).  Further,  while  such 
investment was statistically related to a country‟s energy resources up to 2003, during the 
2004-2006 period investment was affected by non-energy resources alone. 
(v)  Chinese  ECI  would  be  higher  in  countries  with  which  China  has  significant 
trading relationship. Interestingly, the strength of this relationship was greater after China‟s 
accession to the WTO. 
(vi)  There  is  some  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  economic  cooperation  related 
investment  would  be  higher  in  countries  where  the  business  environment  or  institutional 
quality is good. The level of investment is positively associated with the extent of freedom 
from corruption. However, the strength of the relationship is weak, suggesting that corruption 
in a country, or institutional quality in general, may not be a strong deterrent for the Chinese 
state‟s desire to do business with that country. 
(vii) There is statistical and economically meaningful support for the hypothesis that 
the economic cooperation related investment is higher for countries where political rights are 
weak for data for the 1998-2000 period.
16 However, for the most part, this  variable loses 
significance in the recent periods.  This suggests that the propensity of the Chinese state to do 
business with autocratic governments may have lessened recently. 
  In Section 3 of this paper, we had discussed the stylised nature of the impact of our 
explanatory variables on FDI flows and had speculated about the like ly impact of these 
variables on the magnitude and direction of Chinese ECI flows,  under the assumption of 
complementarity between the Chinese state‟s ECI and the outward FDI of the CMNEs. Our 
results  suggest  that  the  hypothesis  of  the  aforementioned  complementarity  is  difficult  to 
reject.  Indeed, our explanatory variables have very similar impact on Chinese ECI as on 
Chinese outward FDI, the latter documented elsewhere in the literature (see Buckley et al., 
                                                 
16 Recount that our measure of political rights is such that a higher measure is associated with lower 
political rights. 20 
 
2008).  Once  again,  therefore,  we  are  able  to  claim  the  presence  of  at  least  prima  facie 
evidence that the Chinese state‟s ECI is at least partly aimed at facilitating the outward FDI 
of  the  country‟s  MNEs.  We  discuss  the  implications  of  this  complementarity  in  the 
concluding section. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The Chinese state undertakes large scale investments in a number of countries under the 
auspices of economic cooperation related investment. While there are suggestions that it is an 
extension of China‟s soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in those countries, often 
for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in the literature. In this 
paper, we examine this investment of the Chinese state over time. Our working hypothesis is 
that China‟s ECI is used to facilitate outward FDI, especially to countries that are rich in 
natural resources. Hence, we use as the basis for our empirical exercise the gravity model that 
is used in the stylised literature to examine the direction of investment flows. In our empirical 
specification, we also control for institutional quality and political characteristics of the ECI 
recipient countries, to account for the popular wisdom that the Chinese state (and firms) often 
does business with countries where political rights and institutional quality are weak.  
Our results suggest that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors 
that are used in the stylised literature to explain directional patterns of outward FDI. They 
also  demonstrate  that  while  there  is  some  support  for  the  popular  wisdom  that  China‟s 
willingness to do business with a country is not strongly affected by its level of corruption, 
there is much weaker support, if any, for the hypotheses that China favours doing business 
with countries where political rights are limited. Similarly, whereas the regression results 
suggest that China‟s ECI is indeed positively related to the natural resource richness of the 
recipient countries, the relationship is not economically meaningful. Further, while energy 21 
 
richness of the recipient countries influenced ECI more during the nineties, in the current 
decade the emphasis seems to have shifted to non-energy minerals.  
Aside from the political economic implications for Chinese ECI and the country‟s 
outward investment, our results have significant implications for EMNEs in general: in order 
to successfully internationalise using outward FDI, it may be important (even imperative) for 
aspiring firms to maintain linkages with their respective governments. Since relationships are 
developed over time, older and well established firms are more likely to be able to leverage 
the state‟s help than relatively new firms. Further, an alliance between the state and firms 
aspiring  to  internationalise  might  require  a  greater  alignment  of  their  interests,  such  that 
government support is more likely to be provided to firms that operate in industries like 
natural gas and oil that involve the strategic interests of the state. Finally, such alliance might 
be useful only if the government itself has sufficient soft or hard power to facilitate the 
internationalisation process of domestic firms. To the extent that the state‟s support is critical 
in the internationalisation process, therefore, firms from relatively weak countries that cannot 
project  power  but  may  be  part  of  regional  alliances  are  more  likely  to  internationalise 
regionally,  while  firms  from  larger  and  more  powerful  emerging  markets  like  the  BRIC 
countries are more likely to internationalise globally. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of China‟s economic cooperation investment (in natural log)  
1998-2000 (left panel); 2001-2003 (middle panel); 2004-2006 (right panel) 
 
0
4
8
12
16
20
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
4
8
12
16
20
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
4
8
12
16
20
2 4 6 8 10 12
 
 26 
 
Figure  2.  China‟s  economic  cooperation  investment  (in  natural  log)  against  the  share  of  energy 
(FUEL) and non-energy exports (MINERAL) to total exports, 1998-2000 (left panel); 2001-2003 
(middle panel); 2004-2006 (right panel) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 20 40 60 80 100
FUEL97
L
E
C
I
9
8
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
FUEL00
L
E
C
I
0
1
0
3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 20 40 60 80 100
FUEL03
L
E
C
I
0
4
0
6
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
MINERAL97
L
E
C
I
9
8
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
MINERAL00
L
E
C
I
0
1
0
3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
MINERAL03
L
E
C
I
0
4
0
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
Figure 3. China‟s economic cooperation investment (in natural log) against freedom from corruption 
(CORRFREE) and political rights (POLRIGHT), 1998-2000 (left panel); 2001-2003 (middle panel); 
2004-2006 (right panel) 
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Notes:  CORRFREE  is  an  index  from  0  to  100  with  high  values  indicating  low  incidence  of 
corruption; POLRIGH is an index ranging from 1 to 1 with 1 indicating the highest level of political 
freedom.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
   2004-2006        2001-2003        1998-2000       
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
ECI  118  353.61  564.83  115  156.73  279.31  93  124.9  276.02 
GDP  118  348  1,070.00  115  329  1,010.00  93  364  1,010.00 
GDPPC  118  10,106.36  9,579.95  115  10,001.62  10,259.20  93  8,730.87  8,820.56 
GEODIST  118  8,960.99  3,861.28  115  8,881.66  3,999.81  93  9,094.71  3,958.08 
CULDIST  118  0.02  0.13  115  0.02  0.13  93  0.02  0.15 
FUEL  118  14.55  24.22  115  19.49  29.68  93  16.83  28.19 
MINERAL  118  8.13  14.55  115  7.56  12.86  93  8.27  15.84 
BITRADE   118  5,558.69  18,212.42  115  3,259.00  10,963.18  93  2,610.79  8,459.70 
CORRFREE  118  43.89  23.39  115  43.96  25.04  93  42.71  24.73 
POLRIGHT  118  3.02  1.97  115  3.22  2.14  93  3.31  2.15 
Notes:  ECI and BITRADE are in millions of US dollars. GDP (in billions) and GDPPC are in constant 2000 international (PPP) dollars.  
GEODIST is in kilometres. Energy (FUEL) and non-energy minerals (MINERAL) are proxies for natural resources (NR), and freedom  
from corruption (CORRFREE) is a proxy for institutional quality (INSTQLTY).  ECI, GDP, GDPPC, GEODIST and BITRADE are in natural 
log form in the correlation matrices.  
 
 29 
 
Table 2. Regression estimates 
 
  “Fuel” specification   “Mineral” specification  
  2004-06  2001-03  1998-00  2004-06  2001-03  1998-00 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant    8.67**    7.92**     7.42    4.92    7.33 *    5.88 
    (4.22)    (3.48)    (5.00)    (3.76)    (3.80)    (5.40) 
(Log) GDP    0.24    0.39 **    0.36    0.23    0.39 **    0.36 
    (0.19)    (0.16)    (0.26)    (0.19)    (0.16)    (0.26) 
(Log) GDP per capita  - 1.20 ***  - 1.22***  - 1.49 ***  - 0.93 ***  - 1.27***  - 1.32 *** 
    (0.28)    (0.26)    (0.36)    (0.28)    (0.28)    (0.35) 
(Log) bilateral trade    0.51 **    0.32 **    0.36 *    0.55***    0.34**    0.30  
    (0.20)    (0.16)    (0.21)    (0.20)    (0.16)    (0.21) 
(Log) Distance  - 0.30  - 0.43 *  - 0.24  - 0.17  - 0.29  - 0.20 
    (0.37)    (0.26)    (0.41)    (0.37)    (0.29)    (0.42) 
Cultural distance    0.88    1.97 **    2.88 ***    0.36    2.01 **    2.64*** 
    (0.77)    (0.94)    (0.96)    (0.67)    (0.92)    (0.79) 
Fuel rich    0.03    0.04 *    0.04 **  -  -  - 
    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)       
Mineral rich  -  -  -    0.09 **    0.02    0.02 
          (0.04)    (0.11)    (0.04) 
Corruption free    0.03 **    0.02 *    0.02     0.02 **    0.01    0.03 ** 
    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01) 
Political rights    0.16     0.19     0.33 **    0.31 ***    0.15     0.35 ** 
    (0.13)    (0.13)    (0.16)    (0.11)    (0.10)    (0.14) 
Fuel rich   - 0.0003  - 0.0003    0.0004  -  -  - 
    Corruption free    (0.0003)    (0.0002)    (0.0003)       
Mineral rich   -  -  -  - 0.0012 *  - 0.0004  - 0.0002 
    Corruption free         (0.0007)  (0.0015)  (0.0005) 
Fuel rich   - 0.0017  - 0.0044  - 0.0082 ***  -  -  - 
    Political rights    (0.0040)    (0.0035)    (0.0028)       
Mineral rich   -  -  -  - 0.0093 *  - 0.0034  - 0.0011 
     Political rights          (0.0051)    (0.0157)    (0.0060) 
             
Observations    118    115    93    118    115    93 
Adjusted R-square    0.41    0.47    0.46    0.41    0.45    0.40 
F-statistic    8.93***    7.84***    7.83 ***    9.03***    8.62***    8.32*** 
Notes:  The values within parentheses are robust standard errors.   ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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